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Disability is a problem for phenomenology. I write this not to declare that disability is 
inherently problematic. It is not. Rather, disability is problematic for phenomenology 
because it challenges some of  the core beliefs that many phenomenologists hold dear. I 
suggest that phenomenological traditions have a lot to learn from the discipline of  disability 
studies—a discipline rooted in human experience, too often ignored by a theoretical 
enterprise that purports to explore human experience rigorously. My claim here is that by 
reflecting on the case of  disability, phenomenologists can take stock of  their tools. We might 
ask: if  our tools cannot deal with the problem of  disability, what good are they?
In what follows, I define disability in two ways. Neither can be taken in isolation; I ask 
that they be read holistically. Nor are they unprecedented; I write them alongside much of  
mainstream disability studies scholarship.
I. INDIVIDUAL AND FUNCTIONAL
I argue that disability is a form of  functional limitation. This reading is in contrast to 
those who would establish a strong ontological divide between disability and impairment. 
Functional limitation emerges in the entanglements of  bodily function and the surrounding 
world. For example, I have muscular dystrophy. My function is restricted both by my body 
(I cannot run, and soon will be unable to walk), but also by my surroundings (the walk to 
my university office, and the atrocious snow clearing in the city in which I live). I write 
“function” to suggest both functions in a public sense, my ability to enter a wedding venue, 
and individual restrictions at the bodily level. Disability is thus proximate to “sickness,” but 
not reduced to it. “Proximate” can mean the relation of  a form of  limitation caused by 
sickness, or it can mean having to account for one’s sickness and one’s disability through the 
same insurance policy. Both forms of  proximity are central to disability.
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II. SOCIAL AND COLLECTIVE
Disability categories shift in time and space. What counts as a disability today, and 
previously has counted as one, are distinct. Who does—and who does not—claim disability 
identity is culturally and historically variable as well. There is a historical and individual 
component to disability categories, and they suggest lives that are deemed valuable 
and lives that are not. Changing categories shift the material lives of  those so classified. 
Disability—not just disability categories, but disability—is collectively defined, historically 
contingent, institutionally distributed, and, in a descriptive sense, moral. In line with most of  
its adherents, I see disability studies as having two primary tasks: 
 
1. Exploring the cultural distribution of  ability and disability, and affirming the 
lives of  disabled persons.
2. Challenging notions of  disability that reduce it to bio-economic loss.
 
In what follows, I examine the Husserlian, Merleau-Pontian, and Heideggerian 
phenomenological traditions. Disability challenges the epistemological framework flowing 
through Husserlian phenomenology. Do we all share the same mental framework that 
makes up the transcendental ego?  Need we, to count as human? Disability challenges, too, 
ideas of  bodily capability that flow through Merleau-Pontian phenomenology. Do we all, 
as humans, share the same embodied experience of  the world? Can disability be anything 
other than the breakdown of  the corporeal schema? Finally—to complete my threefold 
list of  white, male phenomenological traditions—disability challenges the Heideggerian 
tradition. Here, I mean its outright contempt for public life, its disregard for the material 
world outside of  the meaningful structures of  Dasein, and its atomistic neglect of  how 
meaning is made and disclosed in concert with others.
While each of  these challenges asks us to question the benefits of  these three traditions, 
I do not think they are insurmountable. Husserlian phenomenology permits us to consider 
how cognition is enacted between multiple agents. It needn’t be reduced to an atomistic 
rationalism that would exclude those who do not match a single form of  consciousness and 
bodily development (Martiny 2015). Merleau-Pontian phenomenology can also be used to 
show the shared, bodily in-dwelling that bridges the divide between bodies deemed “abled” 
and “disabled,” and those shifting in-between (Reynolds 2017). Finally, as I have argued in 
a short book, Heideggerian phenomenology can be used to explore the space of  collective 
meaning upstream from the spaces of  subjectivity (Abrams 2016). This means attending 
to the institutional world before the meaning I establish within it. Heidegger’s ontological 
project allows us to look at the meaning we establish together, before individual subjects 
are established as abled, disabled, or anything else, in the clinical routine or routine life. 
Heidegger gives us a model that lets us think about disability in non-atomistic ways. In 
each of  these cases, phenomenology is improved when we examine it through the lens of  
disability politics. This demands we address economic issues, on which phenomenology 
has largely been silent. It means thinking about how we live and die together, not only alone 
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like Heidegger’s carpenter. It means thinking about the ways institutions accord and deny 
human worth, rather than simply addressing how we experience such subjection. 
This is not an “ableist apologia” for phenomenology (Dolmage 2017, 35). Like others 
before me (Titchkosky 2000), I cringe every time I read Iris Marion Young claiming that 
“women in sexist society are physically handicapped” in her otherwise excellent paper 
(1980, 152). I cringe, again, when I see disability reduced to bodily breakdown, as it often 
happens in the medical humanities literature. Disability is more than the occurrent hammer 
that breaks, as described in Heidegger’s Being and Time (1996).  And, as a disabled person 
reading Heidegger, I will always have the horrors of  the Holocaust in my mind as I think 
and rethink phenomenology through the hard case of  disability. We need not an apology, 
then, but rather a demand for affirmation. This means affirming the lives of  disabled people 
through phenomenological frameworks. It means orienting phenomenology towards the 
oppression of  marginalized people the world over. And it means admitting to the horrible 
politics phenomenologists have been party to.
The biggest limit that phenomenology must address, if  it is to sufficiently explore 
disability, is to account for the structures of  capitalism. Here I am not suggesting disability 
can be reduced to economic structures, as Michael Oliver (1990) did in his most-cited book. 
I am arguing that if  we are going to address the relational mode through which disability 
emerges, involving both bodies and things, we need to explore the commodity form, 
through which almost everything in the world around us relates. Disability is not just related 
to commodities, as in the prohibitive cost of  power wheelchairs, but through it. Put bluntly: 
exchange value in this world determines who lives and who dies. Health care decision-
making, administration of  disability in the workplace, gendered and racialized care work, 
classroom accommodations, benefits provided, and insurance denied to persons fighting for 
a diagnosis—the list goes on, and on—each of  these have capital and disability in common. 
Each of  these issues are of  prime concern to disability studies. Are they of  prime concern 
to phenomenology? 
The point, then, is this. If  we are going to explore disability meaningfully, we need 
to be able to account for the economic mediators that make disability experience what 
it is. We can read dusty tomes, written by long-dead phenomenologists, and debate the 
nature of  embodiment, the epistemological structures that make up the life-world, or the 
practical notion of  care through which we engage the world. Fine. But we also must be 
able to account for human experience situated in the world of  capital, and the inequalities 
emerging therein. In doing disability studies, in affirming the lives of  disabled people, we 
are pursuing the project that Sara Ahmed put to work in Queer Phenomenology (2006): using 
our lives as situated agents in this world to re-orient the phenomenological tradition. My 
modest addition: this is only possible if  phenomenological tools can be re-oriented at all. 
And if  they can’t be, what good are they?
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